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Lawrence v. Texas' and the New Law of Gay Rights
ARTHUR S. LEoNARD*

On June 26, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court revolutionized the law
pertaining to gay people in the U.S. when it struck down the Texas "Homosexual Conduct Law ' 2 in a far-reaching decision grounded in a constitutional
right of personal liberty that provides a theoretical basis for compelling the
state to treat sexual minorities as fully equal, first-class citizens with the right
to marry, serve in the armed forces, bring their foreign same-sex partners
permanently into the U.S., enjoy equal treatment under the tax laws, adopt
children, and be totally open and out-of-the-closet in every occupation.
That's one way to talk about the Court's decision. Here's an alternative
way:

On June 26, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a theoretically ambiguous
decision that strained to assure that it would have limited consequences
beyond the immediate subject matter of the case, narrowly voted to overrule
a prior decision 3 and strike down the Texas "Homosexual Conduct Law" on
the ground that the state had argued no justification beyond moral disapproval
for intimate conduct that is, in large measure, identical to opposite-sex
conduct that state law allows.
Which is the "correct" way to describe what happened on June 26, 2003,
when the Supreme Court announced its decision in Lawrence v. Texas? Only
time will truly tell. One cannot fully discern the meaning of any decision by
a court of last resort until enough time has passed to see how that decision has
1. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
* Professor, New York Law School. A faculty research grant from New York Law School
supported work on this project. This article is based on a lecture delivered at Ohio Northern Law School
on September 15,2003. The author wishes to acknowledge valuable research assistance by Joshua Feldman
and Joseph Griffin, New York Law School students.
2. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (a) (Vernon 2003).
3. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). "Bowers was not correct when it was decided,
and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and
now is overruled." Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484.
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been treated subsequently by courts that are asked to apply or distinguish its
holding with respect to different sets of facts, and how that court itself comes
to view it as an artifact of the body of constitutional doctrine when citing and
discussing the decision in later opinions. As binding precedent, of course, a
decision is only as powerful as its subsequent applications, although the
clarity, forcefulness, and persuasiveness of a court's language will certainly
influence a decision's precedential scope.
I. HISTORY LEADING TO THE LAWRENCE DECISION

For now, the best we can do is to look at the opinions in Lawrence v.
Texas itself, and speculate about how they may affect the continuing evolution
of the law as it touches on the rights of sexual minorities. As part of this, we
can look at how the decision that it overruled, Bowers v. Hardwick,4 had
influenced the law over the past seventeen years.
Lawrence culminated more than a quarter-century of litigation about the
constitutional validity of laws that criminalize particular forms of sexual
same-sex partners. Such laws in the United States have
intimacy between
"ancient roots"5 deriving from Canon Law enforced by the Roman Catholic
Church in pre-Reformation England, and can even be traced further back to
statutes of Justinian, Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire, almost two
thousand years ago.6 The Church specified that anybody who inserted a penis
into the anus of another person had committed an abominable and detestable
crime against nature, a great sin meriting eternal damnation and dire earthly
punishment, regardless of whether the act was consensual. This sin applied
to both same-sex and opposite-sex conduct, and could not be accomplished by
two women, although the Church found other bases, from New Testament
references, to condemn sexual conduct between women. The Church also
condemned oral sex, and indeed all sexual activity that was not potentially
procreative in nature and that was not restricted to marital partners. When the
English Reformation began, King Henry VIm called upon Parliament to pass
statutes to replace Canon Law as the Roman Church had been dis-established.

4. 478 U.S. at 186.
5. Id. at 192 (White, J., Opinion for the Court). Chief Justice Warren E. Burger's concurring
opinion in Bowers referred to "millennia of moral teaching." Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
6. In the Lawrence majority opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr., recounted some of this
history. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2478-79. The following paragraphs of text can be documented through
the historical sources Justice Kennedy cited, including the nineteenth century treatises on American
criminal law, Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2478, and such twentieth century works as JONATHAN NED KATz,
THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY (1995) and JOHN D'EMtLIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN INTIMATE
MATrERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1997). For other sources on the historical
material, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999)
and DONALD J. KNUTSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW (1980).
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The first English statute against anal sex was enacted in 1533. The law spoke
in euphemistic terms about a "crime against nature," commonly referred to as
"buggery," and everybody knew what was prohibited despite the lack of
specificity. The law was part of the general condemnation of non-procreative
sex derived from religious teachings.
The English law was the law in England's American colonies. When
independence was declared in 1776, the states continued to apply English law
as state common law. During the nineteenth century, many states replaced
their common law crimes with statutes that covered the same subject matter.
Open conversation about sex was not something nineteenth century American
legislators wanted to have, so these statutes continued to perpetuate such
euphemisms as "crime against nature" and "buggery." From time to time, a
court might rule that the statute was limited to the original historical meaning
of anal intercourse, while others applied it to oral sex as well. Some states
revised their statutes early in the twentieth century to be more specific about
forbidden acts. But it was not until the later half of the twentieth century that
states began to recast their laws to allow married couples, and in some cases,
all opposite-sex partners, to engage in such conduct, reacting to the developing
constitutional doctrine of privacy.
In other words, although the kinds of sexual intercourse(but not necessarily every kind of sexual contact) available to same-sex couples were outlawed in all states until 1962, the prohibition was not specifically aimed at gay
people.' During the 1950s, the American Law Institute (ALI), drafting a
Model Penal Code (MPC), devised a section dealing with sex crimes that took
a libertarian stance. Based on the idea that what consenting adults did in
private was generally not the concern of government, the ALI recommended
ending criminal penalties for private, consensual sexual activity between
adults, but retaining penalties for sexual activity that took place in public,
without consent, or between adults and minors. The Model Penal Code also
replaced the vague euphemisms of the common law and many early statutes
with a clinical description of the act that it labeled "deviate sexual intercourse." The MPC made "deviate sexual intercourse" a crime when it did not
meet the requirement of consenting adults acting in private. The MPC also
provided criminal penalties for loitering in a public place for the purpose of
soliciting somebody to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, or for actually
soliciting such activity, on the theory that the government has a public order
interest in limiting sexual solicitation in public places. 9

7. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2478.
8. Id. at 2479. ("American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of
the twentieth century.")
9. MODELPENALCODE § 207.5 (Proposed Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); see ESKRIDGE, supra note
6, at 85.

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Many states adopted the MPC sex crimes provisions, beginning with
Illinois, whose new penal code went into effect in 1962.10 Over the course of
the 1960s and 1970s, most states adopted the Code, but many took the prerogative to modify the sex crimes provisions, retaining criminal penalties for
consensual deviate sexual intercourse, although frequently with lesser
penalties than before, usually making it a misdemeanor." And some states,
such as Georgia, remained with their original felony sodomy laws.
The Supreme Court began to develop a law of sexual privacy with the
Griswold case in 1965,12 and some states modified their laws to reflect the
new understanding that applying their sex crimes laws to consenting marital
partners would raise constitutional issues. 3 The Supreme Court's4 subsequent5
decisions in sexual privacy cases in the areas of contraception, abortion,
and marriage 6 led gay rights advocates and civil libertarians, a group whose
membership significantly overlapped, to begin challenging sodomy laws.
First, there were challenges in states that still had ambiguous definitions,
arguing that the statutes did not give fair notice of what was prohibited,
leaving too much discretion for discriminatory law enforcement. 7 Such arguments failed because, as one federal judge wrote in 1964, the case law had
made it clear
that the crime against nature did not "embrace ....walking on
18
the grass."'

10. 983 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-2 (1961) (effective Jan. 1, 1962 and repealed in 1984).
11. For example, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1998) made it a misdemeanor for persons
not married to each other to engage in anal or oral sex. This statute was declared unconstitutional as
applied to private, noncommercial conduct involving consenting adults in People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d
936 (N.Y. 1980), cert.denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
12. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding Connecticut law banning use of
contraceptives by married persons to prevent pregnancy violated federal constitutional right of privacy).
13. Texas was one such state. In Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), a
three-judge federal district court ruled that the Texas sodomy law, which at that time made it a felony for
anyone, regardless of sex, to engage in anal or oral sex, violated the right of privacy described in Griswold.
Although the decision was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S.
989 (1971), on procedural grounds, the Texas Legislature got the message and reformed its sodomy law,
adopting the Homosexual Conduct Law that was challenged in Lawrence, in its place.
14. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding Texas criminal abortion statute violates federal
constitutional right of privacy).
16. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding Virginia miscegenation statute violates federal
constitutional right of privacy and equal protection).
17. See Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (rejecting argument that "crime against nature"
statute is too vague to meet requirements of federal due process); see also Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48
(1975) (holding crime against nature statute could constitutionally be construed to apply to oral sex even
though it was derived from a English common law statute that condemned only anal sex).
18. Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333, 336 (W.D. N.C. 1964).
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Then, the new privacy cases were summoned as precedent, sometimes
successfully in state courts, 9 but unsuccessfully in the Supreme Court in a
mid-1970s challenge to the Virginia sodomy law, Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, brought by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) as a test
case.2 ° The Supreme Court summarily affirmed a decision rejecting the
challenge to a ruling by a three-judge district court in the Eastern District of
22
Virginia.2 The Supreme Court did not even write an opinion in that case.
But the law did not stand still after Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
and new challenges were mounted to sodomy laws. The Texas Legislature
modified its law during the 1970s, resulting in the Homosexual Conduct
Law,23 which prohibited anal or oral sex for same-sex couples, but treated the
offense as a misdemeanor carrying a token fine. The Texas Human Rights
Foundation challenged that law on both privacy and equal protection grounds,
winning a victory in Baker v. Wade in a federal court in Dallas in 1982, which
turned into defeat a few years later in the Fifth Circuit. 24 In Atlanta, a gay
man, Michael Hardwick, arrested while having oral sex in his bedroom, challenged the Georgia sodomy law, which made it a felony carrying up to twenty
years in prison for any person to engage in sodomy, defined as anal or oral
sex. 25 The U.S. District Court in Atlanta, feeling bound by Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, granted summary judgment for the state, but the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, finding that the Supreme Court's privacy cases applied to
this case as well and that Doe had been superseded by subsequent rulings.26
The State of Georgia successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for
review. The plaintiffs in the Texas case also petitioned the Supreme Court for
review, and the Justices held their petition pending the decision in Michael
Hardwick's case. Bowers v. Hardwick27 was announced at the end of June
1986, ironically as America was about to celebrate the centennial of the Statue
of Liberty. By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court said that the constitutional right
of privacy did not apply to homosexuals engaging in sodomy.2 8 Justice Byron

19. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974) (holding criminal law against oral
sex does not apply to private, consensual adult behavior, thus avoiding constitutional privacy problem).
20. Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty. for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), summarily
aff'd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (a) (Vernon 2003).
24. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.
1984), rev'd en banc, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,478 U.S. 1022 (1986), reh'g denied,478
U.S. 1035 (1986).
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
26. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11 th Cir. 1985).
27. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
28. See id.
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White wrote for the Court, stating that any attempt to equate homosexual
sodomy with the conduct the Court had previously found protected was
"facetious," 29 and that moral disapproval for homosexual conduct by state
legislators provided a sufficient justification to sustain the law under rational
basis review.3" There were lengthy dissenting opinions by Justices Harry
Blackmun, emphasizing the right of privacy, 3' and John Paul Stevens,
emphasizing equal protection.32 A few days later, the Court rejected the
petition for review in the Texas case.33
Defeated, but not beaten, the gay rights movement turned to state courts,
arguing that state constitutions provided a broader right to privacy than that
found in the Fourteenth Amendment. With some exceptions, 34 the movement
was successful in a string of litigation victories beginning during the 1990s,
winning invalidation of the sodomy laws in Tennessee, 35 Kentucky,3 6 Montana,37 Arkansas, 3 Georgia, 39 and Maryland.4" There was continuing litigation
in Texas and some temporary victories in the intermediate courts of appeals,4
but neither the Texas Supreme Court4 2 nor the Texas Court of Criminal

29. Id. at 194.
30. Id. at 196. Under the Court's terminology then used for analyzing claims that a statute violated
the Due Process Clause, a law that did not burden a "fundamental right" would be presumed constitutional,
and the burden being placed on the challenger to show that the state had no rational justification for the law.
In light of the Court's subsequent decisions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and
Lawrence, 1235 S. Ct. at 2472, one may question, as the writer does above, whether this methodology
retains its vitality.
31. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32. Id., at 214-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Baker v. Wade, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
34. The main defeat was in Louisiana, where the state's highest court rejected repeated challenges
to the state's antiquated "crime against nature" law. See La. Electorate of Gays and Lesbians, Inc. v.
Louisiana, 833 So. 2d 1016 (La. 2002); Louisiana v. Smith, 661 So. 2d 442 (La. 1995); Louisiana v.
Baxley, 656 So. 2d 973 (La. 1995).
35. Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
36. Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
37. Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
38. Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002).
39. Powell v. Georgia, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
40. Williams v. Glendening, No. 98 036031-CC1059 (Md. Cir. Ct., Oct. 15, 1998) (unpublished
trial court opinion held that the sodomy law may not be enforced in cases of private consensual adult
activity; government conceded unconstitutionality of the law and settled the case on grounds of a promise
of non-enforcement under described circumstances).
41. Lawrence v. Texas, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-0011 1-CR, 2000 WL 729417 (Tex. Ct. App.
June 8,2003); England v. Texas, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201
(Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
42. Texas v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
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Appeals 43 was willing to invalidate the sodomy law. And there were legislative repeals as well."
By the late 1990s, gay rights litigators had become convinced that it was
time to bring the issue back to the U.S. Supreme Court. Two cases made this
appear feasible. In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,4 5 while reaffirming the core
holding in Roe v. Wade 46 that a woman has a constitutional right during the
first trimester of pregnancy to choose abortion, the Court had used rhetoric
about individual liberty that seemed to apply equally to an individual's choice
of a sexual partner. And, in Romer v. Evans,47 while striking down a Colorado
constitutional amendment that prohibited the state from protecting gays from
discrimination, the Court asserted that dislike or moral disapproval by
legislators or the public could not serve as a legitimate justification for the
state to disfavor a particular social group.
In both cases, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr. was part of the majority
and played a key role, writing the opinion for six members of the Court in
Romer" and participating in the three-member group that produced the
plurality opinion in Caseyag-where he was widely believed to have written
the due process language that gay rights advocates saw as so promising.
Justice David Souter was also part of the majority in both cases. Those who
were counting votes quickly saw that Justices Kennedy and Souter might
provide the fourth and fifth votes for overruling Bowers v. Hardwick and
striking down a state sodomy law. The operative assumption was that Justice
Stevens remained committed to the views he expressed in his Bowers dissent,
and that Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, appointees of
President Bill Clinton who had been receptive to gay rights claims as appeals
court judges5 ° and in the Romer case, would vote to strike down a sodomy law.

43. Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (en banc).
44. NEv. REV. STAT. § 518 (1993) (repealing NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.193); 2001, Ariz. Sess. Laws
382 § 1 (repealing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-1411) (West Supp. 2003).
45. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding a woman's right to chose abortion
is an aspect of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
46. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
47. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding a state constitutional amendment banning state from extending
protection against discrimination to homosexuals violates Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
48. Id. The majority, in addition to Justice Kennedy, included Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra
Day O'Connor, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. Id. The dissenters were Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id.
49. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. The other plurality members were Justices O'Connor and Souter. Id.
Justices John Paul Stevens and Harry Blackmun voted to strike down the statute virtually in its entirety,
while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Byron White, and Clarence Thomas voted to
uphold the statute in its entirety. Id.
50. As to Justice Ginsburg, see Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 700-01 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)
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There was even some hope that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, part of the
Bowers majority, may have moderated her views, as signified by her votes in
Casey and Romer.
II. THE LAWRENCE CASE
Beginning with the Arkansas case filed in the late 1990s," 1 gay rights
litigators resumed their sodomy challenges, including federal constitutional
claims, even though they were still being filed in state courts. When local law
enforcement officials in Houston decided to prosecute a sodomy charge
against John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, the stage was set for an
ideal sodomy law challenge-an actual prosecution involving two consenting
adults in private who had accidentally been discovered by police responding
to a false gun report from a third person.52 Such an opportunity does not come
along very often. (Indeed, as the Supreme Court observed in its decision,
actual prosecutions for private, consensual sodomy are extremely rare in the
case reports throughout American history.53 )
The resulting case produced a temporary victory when a three-judge
panel of the Texas Court of Appeals in Houston declared the Homosexual
Conduct Law unconstitutional,54 but that ruling was quickly reversed en
banc.55 The Court of Criminal Appeals refused to consider the matter,56 and
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari not only on the questions of
whether the Texas statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, but also on the question of whether Bowers should be overruled.57
The Court's opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, is not quick to yield its
doctrinal fruits. On the one hand, it is clear that a majority of the Court was
eager to overrule Bowers. Kennedy subjected that opinion to unmerciful dissection in all of its aspects, and ultimately said that it "was not correct when

(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Edwards,
J., dissenting); Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986). As to Justice Breyer, see Matthews v.
Marsh, 755 F.2d 182, 184 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
51. Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
52. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2475-76; see Steve Brewer, Local Challenge to Law on Sodomy to be
HeardToday, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 22, 1998, at A21; C. Bryson Hull, Challenge to Sodomy Law Moves
to Appeals Court, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 23, 1998, at B7; Lisa Teachey, Defendant in
Sodomy Case Out of JailAfter Assault Charges Dismissed, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 25, 1998, at A23.
53. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2478-79.
54. Lawrence, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-19-00111-CR, 2000 WL 729417.
55. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d 349.
56. The defendants' petition for discretionary review was denied in an unpublished order on April
17, 2002.
57. Lawrence v. Texas, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002) (order granting petition for certiorari and specifying
questions to be addressed).
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it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
58
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." Most of
Justice Kennedy's opinion was devoted to criticizing the Court's opinion in
Bowers for framing the question presented too narrowly, 9 for distorting
historical record,' and for failing to properly apply the evolving constitutional
privacy doctrine. 6
But that does not end the matter. What was the doctrinal basis for declaring the Homosexual Conduct Act unconstitutional? Here, Justice Kennedy's
opinion is opaque. After observing that the case did not involve minors,
coercion, injury, lack of consent, public conduct, prostitution, or a claim for
legal recognition of a same-sex relationship,6 2 the entire doctrinal basis for the
decision boils down to these few sentences:
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent
from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right
to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. It is
a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter. The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.63
Followed by a brief rhetorical paragraph rejecting the claim that due process
protection is limited by the contemplation of the Framers of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments,' that is basically all Justice Kennedy has to say.
Although the earlier parts of the opinion include much discussion about the
history of homosexuality, its legal treatment in the U.S., many assertions about
"liberty," and about the inclusion of gay people's intimate relationships within
the sphere of liberty, Justice Kennedy never actually explains what the full
scope of "liberty" is or why "homosexual conduct" comes within it. He

58. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
59. Id. at 2478.
60. Id. at 2478-80. "In summary," wrote Justice Kennedy, "the historical grounds relief upon in
Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger
indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated." id. at 2480.
61. Id. at 2476-77.
62. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
63. Id. (citation omitted).
64. Id.
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concludes by asserting: "As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom."65
This opinion won five votes-a majority of the Court. One additional
vote to strike the statute came from Justice O'Connor,66 who refused to back
away from her vote in Bowers, here determined that the Homosexual Conduct
Law violated the Equal Protection Clause because it prohibited same-sex
partners from doing what it allowed opposite-sex partners to do.67 This
violated the precedent of Romer v. Evans,68 which disallows imposition of
unequal treatment against specific groups on the basis of moral disapproval
or dislike for those groups.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy briefly considered the
possibility of deciding the case on an equal protection basis, but rejected that
route on the ground that Bowers should be overruled and all sodomy laws
subjected to the same analysis, regardless to whether they singled out samesex couples or not, as an impermissible restriction on personal liberty. 69
Kennedy wrote that striking down the Texas law on equal protection grounds
would leave doubts as to whether sodomy was a constitutionally protected
activity," and a majority of the Court apparently wanted to strike down all
sodomy laws, not just the Texas law.
A lengthy dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas, asserted that the Court had knocked the props out of all
morals legislation and opened a path to same-sex marriage claims. 7 A milder
dissent by Justice Thomas borrowed a leaf from Justice Potter Stewart's
dissent in Griswold, calling the Texas statute a "silly" law that he would vote
against in the legislature, but rejecting the idea that it could be invalidated
through judicial review.72

III.

THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF LAWRENCE

So, where does this leave us? What is the method of analysis for courts
now confronted with claims by lesbian and gay litigants that some governmental policy is treating them unfairly? The range of such claims is quite
broad. The Supreme Court has already given some attention to one, and gay

65. Id.
66. Id. at 2284-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Sodomy between opposite-sex
partners, however, is not a crime in Texas. That is, Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely
on the participants.")
68. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
69. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2488-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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litigants have already filed suit to claim the benefit of the Lawrence ruling in
some other areas.
When the Court decided Lawrence, it also had before it a petition in the
case of Limon v. Kansas.73 Mr. Limon, now twenty-one, had just turned
eighteen years old when he was charged with sodomy for initiating oral sex
with a fellow male resident of a state institution for learning-impaired teens.
His "partner in crime" was just shy of fifteen years old. Under Kansas law,
consensual oral sex between persons of the same sex is a misdemeanor
carrying either a six-month prison sentence or an one-thousand-dollar fineunless, it seems, the act involved an adult having oral sex with a minor in
which case it was treated as a serious felony carrying a lengthy prison term.
Since Mr. Limon had turned eighteen, he was an adult, and he was sentenced
to seventeen years in prison. Interestingly, had his sex partner been an
underage girl instead of a boy, he would have been charged only with sexual
assault and, due to the closeness of their ages, subject to a maximum prison
term of thirteen to fifteen months. The ACLU assisted Limon in appealing his
sentence, which he had begun to serve. The Kansas courts rejected the
argument that there was any constitutional infirmity here citing Bowers, but
the U.S. Supreme Court, just days after Lawrence, granted a writ of certiorari,
vacated the Kansas Court of Appeals decision, and remanded the case for
reconsideration "in light of Lawrence v. Texas. 74
What is it about Lawrence that would require a different result in Limon?
Could Lawrence be construed to mean that an eighteen-year-old man has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in having a not-quite-fifteen-year-old
boy as a partner for oral sex? Does the Court mean to extend the more general
right to sexual intimacy to teenagers? Or is this more of an equal protection
case as it had been framed by the ACLU in its petition for certiorari? If so,
what does Lawrence mean for equal protection analysis? Bowers, the case
that Lawrence overruled, had turned out to be quite significant for equal
protection analysis, at least in the eyes of many federal judges confronting
equal protection cases after Bowers was decided.7"
Just one year after Bowers v. Hardwick, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, rejecting an equal protection challenge to the FBI's policy against

73. Limon v. Kansas, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (unpublished table decision).
74. Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct. 2638. For a journalistic account of the facts, see Tony Rizzo,
Kansas Told to Rethink Gay Sex Case, KANsAs CITY STAR, June 28, 2003, at Al.
75. "Equal Protection" is mentioned just once in the Court's opinion in Bowers, in a footnote noting
that the respondents were not defending the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in their favor on the basis of equal
protection. 478 U.S. at 196, n.8. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun states his disagreement with the Court's
"refusal" to consider an equal protection challenge to the Georgia sodomy law. 478 U.S. at 201. Justice
Stevens' dissent in Bowers is devoted to arguing that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause. 478
U.S. at 214-20.
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hiring lesbian or gay applicants, asserted that since the conduct-homosexual
sodomy-that defined the class-lesbians and gay men-was not constitutionally protected and, in fact, could be criminalized, it was not possible for
a gay litigant to claim that the government could not subject her to the less
serious disadvantage of denial of employment.76 In other words, the D.C.
Circuit ruled that because of Bowers, lesbians and gay men could not be a
"suspect class" for equal protection purposes (or, putting it more precisely,
sexual orientation would not be considered a suspect classification), and thus
discrimination against gay people was presumptively constitutional as long as
the court could imagine some rational justification. The court said that the
FBI, as a law enforcement agency, could rationally prefer not to hire people
whose sex lives made them criminals in half of the states.77 And that was that.
Only one federal appeals court in the aftermath of Bowers was willing to
suggest any kind of heightened scrutiny for equal protection claims by gay
litigants, and that was a three-judge panel whose decision was revoked for en
banc review in a military case.78
Now that Bowers is gone as precedent, how will the federal courts
analyze equal protection claims brought by gay litigants? The only Supreme
Court decision about gays involving an equal protection claim is Romer v.
Evans, the 1996 case in which the Court struck down Colorado Amendment
2," a popularly-enacted measure intended to prevent the state or its political
subdivisions from adopting laws or rules that would treat gay people as a
protected class or entitle gay people to assert discrimination claims. In Romer,
Justice Kennedy, writing for six members of the Court, asserted that this kind
of sweeping measure expressly targeted at a particular group was alien to our
legal traditions and so lacking in rational justification as to defy any sort of
traditional equal protection analysis.8 0 The Romer opinion never directly
discussed whether sexual orientation discrimination claims would merit
heightened scrutiny, or how such claims would fall along the equal protection
scale between suspect and non-suspect classifications. Finding the Colorado
amendment lacking in rational justification, the Court struck it down. s" Many
subsequent lower federal court decisions have treated Romer as if it held that
82
sexual orientation claims merit only rational basis review.

76. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
77. Id. at 104.
78. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). The panel decision
holding 2-1 that heightened scrutiny should be given to the military's exclusionary regulations was
published, as amended, at 847 F. 2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988).
79. Romer vs. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
80. Id. at 633.
81. Id. at 635.
82. See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2002); Equality Found., Inc. v.
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In her Lawrence concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor suggested that
Romer was one of a collection of equal protection cases in which the common
element was government interference with personal relationships.83 In such
cases, she suggested the Court had applied a "more searching" version of the
rational basis test.84 That is, it is not enough for the state to put forward some
vaguely plausible reason for what it is doing. At the very least, it has to put
forth a legitimate state concern that is actually advanced by applying the discriminatory policy, and a bare desire to harm or treat as unequal a particular
group of people cannot count as such a legitimate concern. In Lawrence,
O'Connor said that moral disapproval of gay people, or a state desire to signal
that gay people are inferior citizens, could not serve as such a legitimate
rationale for the sodomy law does not apply to opposite-sex couples.86
How would this play out in Limon? Could the state say that there is some
legitimate reason to treat oral sex as a grave felony offense when an eighteen
year old performs it with a fifteen year old of the same sex, but only as a
misdemeanor when an eighteen year old performs it with a member of the
opposite sex? Clearly, the state believes homosexual conduct is a graver
offense than heterosexual conduct when it involves teens, but the question is
why? Is it just moral disapproval? Is it a belief that homosexual conduct is
more harmful or more stressful and could do greater psychological or physical
damage? After Lawrence, can the state just assert this, or must it come forth
with some sort of empirical evidence? What if the legislative history is silent
on the motivation of the legislators? As the case is now on remand, we do not
yet know how the Kansas courts will respond. The ACLU may argue that
Lawrence effectively held that gay sex is a fundamental right and that strict
scrutiny should be applied to the Kansas law. And the state would undoubtedly argue to the contrary.87 But the Supreme Court's action of remanding
certainly seems to signal that the post-Bowers equal protection analysisassuming that anti-gay discrimination merits no heightened scrutiny in equal
protection cases-is invalid under Lawrence, or at least has to be re-thought.88

City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th
Cir. 1997).
83. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 2485-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Apparently oblivious to the Supreme Court's stated disapproval of using legislative moral
judgments as the basis for justifying unequal treatment for distinct classes of people, the Kansas Attorney
General has apparently made the argument on remand that the state should be able to make the distinction
that it made in Matthew Limon's case on grounds of moral disapproval. See Mike Hendricks, Legislating
a Skewed Morality, KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept. 19, 2003, at B2 (reporting on the argument held before the
Kansas Court of Appeals on remand).
88. On January 30, 2004, a three-judge panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals reaffirmed its original
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A lawsuit filed in Arizona immediately after Lawrence directly raises the
question of same-sex marriage. 9 Justice Kennedy, in the penultimate paragraph of his opinion, said that the challenge to the Texas statute "does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."9 Similarly, Justice O'Connor,
in her concurrence, suggested that her equal protection analysis with its "more
searching" rationality review,
does not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals
and homosexuals would similarly fail ....Texas cannot assert any
legitimate state interest here, such as national security or preserving
the traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval
of same-sex relations-the asserted state interest in this case-other
reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere
moral disapproval of an excluded group.9
Reacting to these comments, Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent that Justice O'Connor's reasoning "leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples."9 2 Scalia asserts that the main basis for
denying same-sex marriage is moral disapproval for same-sex relationships,
and once that disappears from the equation as a valid justification, what can
the state argue?93 Taking on Justice Kennedy's assertion that the Texas case
did not present the question as to whether the government needs to formally
recognize same-sex relationships, Scalia insisted:
Do not believe it. More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned
disclaimer is the progression of thought displayed by an earlier passage in the Court's opinion, which notes the constitutional protections
afforded to "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," and
then declares that "persons... in a homosexual relationship may seek
autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do."94

decision by a 2-1 vote, opining that because Lawrence v. Texas was a due process case about sex between
adults, it was not relevant to Umon's equal protection claim. limon v. Kansas, 2004 Westlaw 177649.
The ACLU announced that it would appeal this ruling. The dissent described the rational bases for the law
identified by the majority as "incomprehensible."
89. Standhardt v. Superior Court, No. I CA-SA 03-0150, 2003 WL 22299701 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct.
8, 2003).
90. Lawrence, 1235 S.Ct. at 2484.
91. Id. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 2498 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
94. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia argued that the logic of the Court's opinion "dismantles the
structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made
between heterosexual and 95
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition
in marriage is concerned.,
A gay couple in Arizona decided immediately to test Scalia's prophecy.
Don Standhardt and Tod Keltner, who have lived together as domestic
partners for six years and run a travel agency together, decided to marry. 96
They went with their lawyer, Michael Ryan, to the local city clerk's office to
apply for a license. When they were turned down, Ryan filed an action in the
Arizona Court of Appeals, seeking an order to the clerk to grant the license. 97
Standhardt and Keltner claimed that Arizona could not justify denying them
a marriage license under Lawrence.98 The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed with them, noting that both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor had
specifically stated (the first by indirection and the second more directly) that
the Lawrence ruling was not taking on the marriage issue, and asserting, with
"due respect" to Justice Scalia, that the state did have a rational basis for
seeking to promote traditional heterosexual marriages by limiting the rights
and benefits of marriage to such unions based on the legislature's judgment
that children are best conceived and raised within a traditional heterosexual
marriage. 99 Standhardt and Keltner appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, two other same-sex marriage lawsuits were pending in
Massachusetts and New Jersey. In the former, the Supreme Judicial Court,
citing Lawrence, ruled that the state's exclusion of same-sex couples from the
right to marry violated the equality requirements of the state constitution."
In the latter, a state trial judge, seizing the comments in Lawrence by Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor that the marriage issue raised different questions,
granted the state's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs
appealed.'
Then there is the military. The armed services had a formal policy of
attempting to identify and deny enlistment to gay people, and to dismiss them
from the armed forces if they were discovered, beginning with World War
11.102 Before 1993, this was a matter of regulations implementing Article 125

95. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. See Standhardt,No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150, 2003 WL 22299701, at *1.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at § 17-18, 33-41.
100. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 723 N.E.2d 1 (2003); Opinions of the Justices to the
Senate, 2004 WL 202184 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 3, 2004) (reiterating the earlier holding and opining
that a proposed civil union bill that would forbid same-sex marriage was unconstitutional).
101. Lewis v. Harris, 2003 WL 23191114 (N.J. Superior Ct. 2003).
102.

See RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS & LESBIANS IN THE U.S.MILITARY (1993).
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of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which is a sodomy law. 103
(We have to ask whether Article 125 remains valid in light of Lawrence, an
issue that will most likely be first confronted in the context of court-martial
proceedings or an action by a discharged gay service member seeking a
"correction" in his veteran status. °4) In the 1992 Presidential election, Bill
Clinton promised that if elected, he would repeal the regulation in an
executive order as President Harry Truman had-ending racial segregation in
the military by executive order. But when Clinton reiterated this after he was
elected, military commanders and their allies in Congress loudly protested that
letting gay people serve would destroy the effectiveness of the military. And
Clinton backed away from his promise. Instead, Congress enacted legislation,
accepted by Clinton, embodying "don't ask, don't tell."1 °5 For the first time,
the gay ban was statutory, but to avoid potentially unconstitutional status
discrimination, it was carefully phrased to be a ban against people with a
propensity to engage in homosexual conduct rather than a ban on "homosexuals."'0 6 Congress declared that "homosexuality" (presumably, the performance of homosexual acts) was "incompatible" with military service, and
detrimental to unit cohesion and morale based on the assumption that the
presence of openly gay members would cause dissension among their non-gay
colleagues.'0 7
Gays can enlist and serve so long as they keep their sexual orientation a
secret. Any word or gesture signaling same-sex orientation triggers the presumption that they have a propensity to violate Article 125 of the UCMJ and,
unless they can prove that they do not have such a propensity, they are subject

This book provides a detailed history of U.S. military policy towards "homosexuals," culminating with the
beginning of the public discussions that led to the "don't ask, don't tell" policy adopted in 1993 by
Congress and the President.
103. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, art. 125 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 925, 2001) provides:
"Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the
same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
complete the offense."
104. Both kinds of proceedings were underway at the time of writing. Charles Lane, Sodomy Ruling
Spurs Challenges to Military'sPolicy on Gays, WASH. POST, August 4, 2003 at Al. According to press
releases issued by Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, (SLDN), an organization established to provide
legal advice to members of the U.S. Armed Services relating to sexual orientation, on October 7' and
Lambda Legal on October 2"', both in 2003, gay rights legal groups have filed amicus briefs in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in a pending appeal of a military sodomy conviction, urging the
court to declare Article 125 unconstitutional in light of Lawrence. Oral argument was heard on October
7"'. Similar articles are being raised in other pending military sodomy prosecutions, according to the
Lambda Legal Press release. Press releases are availableat http://www.sldn.org and http://www.lambda
legal.org.
105. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2001).
106. Id. § 654 (a) (15).
107. See id.
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to discharge. This was presented to the public as a compromise under which
gays who were discreet could continue to serve in the military, but it has been
a formula for disaster. The number of military members discharged under
these rules was actually larger than the numbers who were being discharged
under prior regulations, even though the military was shrinking throughout the
1990s.108
Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Lawrence, Loren S. Loomis sued in the U.S. District Court in Washington,
D.C., seeking to reverse his discharge and have his military record corrected. °9 Loomis was wounded in the Vietnam War, won two Bronze Stars
and a Purple Heart for his service, remained in the Army, and attained the rank
of lieutenant colonel. He was stationed at Fort Hood, Texas in 1996 when his
house burned down. A firefighter found a videotape showing Loomis engaged
in gay sex and turned it over to the Army. The fire was set by an Army private
who said he had posed for nude photographs for Loomis and had burned down
the house to destroy the evidence. The Army discharged Loomis under "other
than honorable" conditions, one week short of him attaining his twentieth
anniversary in the Army, which would have entitled him to full retirement
benefits."0
Loomis claims that Article 125 is unconstitutional as well as the "don't
ask, don't tell" policy. Numerous federal courts have upheld the policy, "' and
military courts have uniformly rejected constitutional challenges to Article
125, citing Bowers." 2 In Lawrence, the Court said that Bowers was incorrect

108. According to data presented on the website of the SLDN, the number of persons discharged
under the military policy on homosexuality during the years of the Clinton Administration were as follows:
1994: 617; 1995: 772; 1996: 870; 1997: 1,007; 1998: 1,163; 1999: 1,046; 2000: 1231. Servicemembers
Legal Defense Network, at http://www.sldn.org (Oct. 14, 2003). According to the organization's 8'
Annual Report, more than 1,250 service members were discharged on grounds related to homosexuality
during 2001. Id. Thus, more than 7,800 uniformed military personnel were discharged under this policy.
Id. The SLDN based its numbers on data obtained from the U.S. Department of Defense. Id.
109. Kim Cobb, Sodomy Ruling May Affect Military; Gay Ex-solder Thinks His Case Could Topple
Don 'tAsk, Don 't-Tell Policy, HOUS. CHRON., July 14,2003 at A1; George Edmonson, Lawsuit Challenges
Military's Gay Policy; Texas Sodomy Ruling May Influence Courts, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTiON,
July 20, 2003 at 5A; Gay Man, Citing Supreme Court Ruling, Fights '97 Army Discharge,N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2003 at A14. The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia in July, 2003.
110. Details about Loomis's discharge can be gleaned from the newspaper articles cited above.
111. Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d
1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Thorne v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 139
F.3d 893; Selland v. Perry, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir.1996).
112. United States v. Allen, No. ACM 32727, 1999 WL 305093 (C. Crim. App. A.F. April 22, 1999)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to military sodomy regulations as applied to consenting adult heterosexuals); United States v. Modesto, 39 M.J. 1055 (affirming military conviction of dismissal and confinement for sodomy and cross-dressing); United States v. Fagg, 34 M.J. 179 (1992), on remand, No. ACM
29129 (F Rev), 1992 WL 129473 (C.M.R. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 829 (1992) (upholding military
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when decided, which surely means that Lawrence is a decision with retroactive effect. Does this mean that Article 125 was unconstitutional when
Loomis was discharged? Does this mean that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy
has been unconstitutional since 1993, and that the federal government is
to thousands of service members who were discharged under
potentially liable
3
this policy? 1
Justice O'Connor included a fleeting reference to this issue in her concurring opinion in Lawrence when she said that "national security" might
provide a justification for treating heterosexuals and homosexuals differently." 4 But under the "more searching" rational basis review that she
would apply to anti-gay governmental policies, is it enough for the Defense
Department to cite "national security," or do they have to provide some real
evidence that keeping openly gay people out of the military, and preventing
gay military members from having sex, is justified by national security
concerns? Numerous military allies of the United States have ended their gay
bans-some for more than ten years-and there is no evidence that their
military readiness has been affected. Would a Supreme Court, faced with this
evidence, find that the U.S. Department of Defense had justified the
discrimination sufficiently to meet a "more searching" rational basis test?
Meanwhile, in one of the first decisions to cite Lawrence, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals revived a lawsuit by Dr. John Hensala, a psychiatrist who
was dismissed from the service after "coming out" as gay in a letter to his
commander." 5 The Pentagon was dunning Hensala for the $71,000 in
scholarship assistance they gave him for medical school. He sued to escape
that liability, claiming he was willing to serve and the policies applied to him
were unconstitutional. A district judge ruled against Hensala on a pretrial
motion, but a 2-1 vote in the Ninth Circuit brings it back to life for trial, based
on Hensala's allegation that enforcement of the policy against him was
discriminatory.
Of course, the military question presents distinctive concerns since the
Supreme Court has held that individual civil rights may have to bend in a

law against heterosexual sodomy); United States. v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174 (1992) (upholding law against
heterosexual sodomy).
113. The United Kingdom has already been confronting this issue as military members, who were
discharged prior to a determination by the European Court of Human Rights that the British military gay
ban violated European law, have sued for recompense. Responding to the Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence, U.S. Representative Barney Frank (D. Mass.) filed a bill calling for the amendment of Article
125 in order to insert the word "nonconsensual" and add a definition of consent as well as to exempt from
the operation of the provision consensual acts of a sexual nature between adults that are not for compensation and cohabitation of adults. Anti-Hypocrisy Act of 2003, H.R. 2676, 108th Cong. (2003).
114. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Hensala v. Dep't of Air Force, 343 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2003).
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military context to accommodate national security. 1 6 In a test case challenging the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled just a few years ago that regardless of a constitutional equal
protection analysis, the doctrine of deference to military expertise in personnel
matters compelled a ruling against the challengers." 7 Perhaps judicial
deference to military expertise will continue to control this question.
It is surely correct to observe that the current military policy shows disrespect for gay people as a group, and this is precisely what Justice Kennedy
suggests in Lawrence is not a proper role for government. But whether the
broad, and somewhat vague notion of liberty taken from that opinion is strong
enough to strike down the military ban is a matter of some doubt.
On a more practical level, however, a significant effect of Lawrence is
to remove Bowers as constitutional precedent. Bowers has been the lynch pin
for numerous lower court rulings-not just on gay issues-that involved
individual claims of privacy and protection for intimate life and choice.
Bowers has frequently been cited for the general proposition that due process
claims on behalf of unenumerated constitutional rights are disfavored, and that
only those rights that are well-secured in our history can be protected by the
Due Process Clause." 18 Bowers has been cited more specifically to support
decisions denying or demeaning the parental rights of gay people." 9 It was

116. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (First Amendment free exercise rights
of a military chaplain had to yield to the military necessity of wearing distinctly religious garb while on
duty); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (noting distinction between military and civilian life with
respect to individual rights).
117. Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
118. See, e.g., Hemdon v. Chapel-Hill-Carboro City Bd. of Edu., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting due process and Thirteenth Amendment challenges to school board's requirement that students
perform pro bono work as a graduation requirement); Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
due process claim of a right to have public investigation files purged where the target of the investigation
was cleared of wrongdoing); Peyote Way Church ofGod, Inc. v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991)
(refusing to take an expansive view of fundamental rights not expressly articulated in the Constitution);
Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting due process challenge to local ordinance that
outlawed "cruising" around a major town thoroughfare); Griffith v. Johnson, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990)
(rejecting due process privacy argument concerning a state-operated adoption program); Davis v. Bucher,
853 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1969) (rejecting a privacy claim arising from corrections officers exchanging nude
photographs of inmates on grounds that there is no express warrant for such a right in the Constitution).
These cases are merely illustrative of scores of similar rulings citing and relying on Bowers.
119. See Opinion of the Justices, 525 A.2d 1095 (1987) (Bowers cited in decision upholding
constitutionality of state law disqualifying gay people from being adoptive parents); Thigpen v. Carpenter,
730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding denial of custody to lesbian mother); Florida v. Cox, 627
So.2d 1210 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1993), (rejecting constitutional challenge to state statute forbidding "homosexuals" from adopting children); S.B. v. L.W., 793 So. 2d 656 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding denial
of custody to lesbian mother); J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. App. 1989) (upholding restrictions on
visitation rights of gay father); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992) (requiring restrictions
on lesbian mother's visitation rights).
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cited by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in upholding a
Cincinnati charter amendment that was a virtual duplicate of Colorado
Amendment 2.121 It was cited by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh2
Circuit in upholding a state law banning the sale or possession of sex toys.' 1
It was also cited by the Eleventh Circuit in rejecting an employment discrimination claim by Robin Shahar, a lesbian attorney whose offer of a job
with the Georgia Attorney General's Office was withdrawn when she had a
same-sex commitment ceremony.122 The court accepted the argument that the
Georgia Attorney General should not have to employ somebody who was a
presumptive violator of the state's sodomy law. (Ironically, the Georgia
Attorney General, Michael Bowers, later lost his political career when it came
to light that he was having an adulterous affair with a woman who worked in
his office in violation of Georgia's adultery and fornication laws. 123)
Bowers was cited by the Texas Supreme Court in rejecting an employment discrimination claim by a police officer who was fired because he was
having an affair with a married woman. 24 Bowers has been cited by courts
upholding claims of per se defamation on the ground that calling somebody
gay is like calling them a criminal. 25 Bowers was cited to justify the Department of Defense's Security Clearance Office procedures that required special
investigations of any applicant for a security clearance who was discovered
to be gay. 126 It has been broadly cited in an array of cases where individuals
claimed they were unfairly treated by the government due to their private
activities-cases involving prostitution, for
sexual activities, and not just gay
127
example, as well as adultery.
In the absence of Bowers, as Justice Scalia observed in his dissent, the
legal analysis begins anew on the array of sex crimes that penalize fornication,
adultery, masturbation, and prostitution. 28 It is certainly possible to distinguish all of these activities from consensual gay sex in carrying out the
analysis, but the Lawrence decision speaks broadly about liberty without
adopting an analytical framework to determine what kinds of sexual activities
come within that liberty. Justice Kennedy does, in criticizing the Bowers
120. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 292 (6th Cir.
1997).
121. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (lth Cir. 2001).
122. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1104 (1lth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1049 (1997).
123. Paul M. Barrett, ConsentingAdults: He Admits Adultery, She Marrieda Woman; They Clash
on Values, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1997, at Al.
124. City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464,469 (Tex. 1996).
125. Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying Texas law); Head
v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
126. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990).
127. Henry, 928 S.W.2d at 464.
128. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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decision, emphasize the role of sex in the formation and perpetuation of
intimate relationships, thus perhaps suggesting that the constitutional analysis
should be different in considering casual sex as opposed to sex that is part of
a relationship since the state might actually have good public health reasons
to be concerned about the former more than the latter.
But perhaps a more fruitful way of speculating about the impact of
Lawrence v. Texas is to step back from the immediate question faced by the
Court-whether convicting John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner for their
private, consensual act of sodomy violated their constitutional rights-and to
look again at the methodology the Court used to evaluate that claim. As
Justice Scalia observed, the Court never stated that people have a "fundamental right" to engage in gay sex,129 and yet the Court put the state to a stricter
burden ofjustification than would normally be required for a due process case
that does not involve a "fundamental right." Past opinions, including Bowers,
had grounded the fundamental rights analysis in history and refused to accord
recognition to rights claimed that had lacked some longstanding social
imprimatur. Yet Justice Kennedy dwelt on the way that knowledge and
societal attitudes had changed over the past half a century regarding homosexuality, treating this just as significant, if not more so, than prior history in
deciding whether the right claimed was important enough to merit constitutional protection as an aspect of "liberty" under the Due Process Clause,130 and
referred to evolving standards of human rights in other countries-something
almost unprecedented for a United States Supreme Court opinion.131 A
majority of the Court is apparently signaling that serious judicial review under
the Due Process Clause may be premised on factors other than the long time
historical regard for the particular activity. The Court may finally be
acknowledging through this shift in rhetoric and method that as the pace of
social change has accelerated, a jurisprudence of rationality evaluation for
challenged legislation must become more meaningful if the basic principles
of substantive due process-that the state must have an objectively valid
justification for restricting individual liberty-are to be given due weight.
Perhaps the Court is abandoning the project of identifying "fundamental"
rights so that lower courts can no longer simply apply a mechanistic tiered
approach to judicial review. And instead is challenging the lower courts (and

129. Id. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id.at2480-81.
131. Id. at 2481. Justice Scalia commented, "[tihe Court's discussion of these foreign views
(ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore
meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this Court... should not impose foreign moods, fads,
or fashions on Americans.' Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n. (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari)." Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster)537 U.S., at 991 (Thomas, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari)).
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legislators who care whether their proposals are constitutional) to engage in
a more nuanced, more "searching" (to use Justice O'Connor's term) evaluation of legislation that imposes hardship or disadvantage on identifiable
groups of people. If so, then the Court is revolutionizing the framework of
constitutional analysis as Justice Scalia suggests in his dissent. While Justice
Scalia evidently considers this a bad thing, one may legitimately ask whether
the regime that it replaces provided
a satisfactory basis for preserving
13 2
individual liberty in America.

132. Another case that was pending when Lawrence was decided was Lofton v. Secretary of the
Departmentof ChildrenandFamily Services, a challenge to a Florida statute that categorically disqualifies
"homosexuals" from adopting children in the State of Florida. A federal district court had rejected the
challenge, and the Eleventh Circuit had received briefs and heard oral arguments. After Lawrence, the
parties filed supplemental briefs. On January 28, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit panel issued its decision, 2004
WL 161275, unanimously affirming the district court, treating Lawrence as a narrow, somewhat inscrutable
decision that had nothing to say about equal protection, and was narrowly focused on the criminalization
of intimate conduct.

